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Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction 
 This dissertation explores legal issues related to factual causation in 
silicosis and tuberculosis compensation claims against gold mining companies in 
South Africa. Its focus is the silicosis and tuberculosis class action certification 
judgment of Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and 
Others (“Nkala/the certification judgment”),1 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
(“Mankayi),2 and the seminal Constitutional Court (“CC”) judgment, Lee v 
Minister of Correctional Services (“Lee”).3 This dissertation follows the Nkala 
judgment in order to add clarity to further Nkala class action litigation and future 
silicosis and tuberculosis compensation claims heard in South African courts.  
 
 1.1.2 Structure of the Dissertation 
 Chapter 2 serves as a definitions section, briefly outlining the definitions, 
causes and relationship between silicosis, silico-tuberculosis and pulmonary 
tuberculosis within the South African gold mining sector. It also includes an 
explanation of the relationship between these diseases and HIV/AIDS to explain 
that HIV/AIDS, as well as silicosis, are both risk factors that can contribute to a 
mineworker’s susceptibility to TB.4 The engineering and medical measures which 
mining companies should be incorporating to mitigate and even prevent 
exposure to silicosis and tuberculosis will also be addressed.5  
 Chapter 3 outlines the history of silicosis and tuberculosis litigation in 
South Africa, from the Mankayi judgment to the Nkala class action certification 
                                                
1 Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Others (48226/12, 31324/12, 
31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) [2016] ZAGPJHC 97; [2016] 3 All SA 233 (GJ); 2016 
(7) BCLR 881 (GJ) (13 May 2016).  
2 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 32 ILJ 545 (CC). 
3 Lee v Minister of Correctional Services (CCT 20/12) [2012] ZACC 30. 
4 Rodney Ehrlich, ‘Interview with Rodney Ehrlich’ (14/11/2016) (Annexure ‘A’). 
5 Ibid. 
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judgment, and explains why it has taken approximately a century for delict 
compensation claims for silicosis and TB to be brought before South African 
courts. These reasons include the fact that Mankayi was a seminal moment in 
our law, which allowed for such a claim to be brought, because the CC ruled that 
legislation does not exclude mineworkers from bringing a common law claim by 
way of the law of delict for compensation for occupational diseases.6 Further 
reasons for the delay are explored, including the lack of legal representation of 
mineworkers during the apartheid era.7  
 Chapter 4 discusses the reasons why the Constitutional Court’s Lee 
judgment is precedent for assessing the factual causation element with reference 
to the TB class. Analogies are drawn between the powerful positions of the State 
and mining companies and the vulnerable positions of prisoners and 
mineworkers.8 Focus is put squarely on the horizontal application of 
constitutional rights provided for in section 8(2) of the Constitution.9 It is argued 
that section 8(2) places a legal obligation on private parties to uphold and to 
respect the rights of other private persons, and that mining companies are 
therefore obliged to respect and protect mineworkers’ constitutional rights.10 This 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the nature and contents of the 
constitutional duties owed by mining companies to their employees. Reasons 
why the factual causation of the silicosis class can be assessed fairly by the 
                                                
6 Supra note 2 (Mankayi) at 107.     
7 See Mathias Nyenti ‘Access to justice in the South African social security system: Towards a 
conceptual approach’ (2013) 44 De Jure 901 at 913. 
8 See note 3 (Lee) at para 65 for a discussion on the vulnerability of prisoners in South Africa; 
See also Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd and Others 2016 (5) SA 240 (GJ) 
Applicants’ Submissions at footnote 221 Available at: 
http://lrc.org.za/lrcarchive/images/pdf_downloads/Court_papers/2015/2015_Silicosis_Applicants_
Heads_of_argument.PDF. 
9 Section 8(2) of the Constitution states the following: “A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 
natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature 
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by that right.” 
10 Currie, Ian & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) Juta & Co. Ltd, Cape 
Town at 48; Supra note 1 (Nkala) at para 58.3. 
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application of the material contribution test are also addressed.11 
 Chapter 5 includes an analysis of the specific common law and statutory 
duties of care owed by the Respondents to the Applicants.12 Proving a duty of 
care is a requirement of the material increase of risk test relevant to the TB class, 
as well as a requirement of the material contribution test, pertaining to the 
silicosis class.13 The English cases discussed are Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral 
Services Ltd,14 McGhee v National Coal Board15 and Bonnington Castings v 
Wardlaw.16 It is argued that the mining companies (“the Respondents/the 
Respondent mining companies”) were aware of the duties of care owed to their 
employees, yet breached them over years of systematic unlawful treatment in 
their mines.17 
 Chapter 6 briefly discusses the proper avenue through which 
compensation should be claimed – a delict claim or a statutory compensation 
scheme. It is noted that a delict claim is, in certain circumstances, a proper 
remedy for the vindication of constitutional rights.18 It is argued that should the 
mineworkers be successful in their claim for compensation, that a private trust 
could be set up to fairly distribute the compensation,19 and that a delict claim is 
the appropriate legal avenue through which to claim compensation until a 
statutory compensation scheme is realised. 
                                                
11 Alistair Price 'Constitutionalising Rights and Reacting to Risk' in Matthew Dyson (ed) 
Regulating Risk Through Private Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017) (forthcoming) at 11-12. 
12 Supra note 1 (Nkala) at para 59.  
13 McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 at 76.  
14 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32. 
15 McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1. 
16 Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw 1956 AC 513 at 3.  
17 Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd and Others 2016 (5) SA 240 (GJ) Applicants’ 
Submissions at 15 Available at: 
http://lrc.org.za/lrcarchive/images/pdf_downloads/Court_papers/2015/2015_Silicosis_Applicants_
Heads_of_argument.PDF.  
18 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) at paras 74 and 79.  
19 Richard Meeran and Shanta Martin ‘Miners’ silicosis paves way for industry compensation 




1.2  Research Methodology 
 This dissertation is predominantly supported by primary sources in the 
form of legislation and policy documents, South African and English case law, on 
the one hand, and secondary sources, including the writing of legal scholars who 
have focused on the subject, on the other. A portion of this dissertation also 
includes interviews with a legal expert and a medical expert. 
 Legal research is predominantly focused on scholarly writing and black-
letter law, which stems from a reliance in courts and legal academia on primary 
and substantiated legal rules and research.20 Yet there is motivation for legal 
research to welcome other forms, such as qualitative research, which includes 
interviews.21 Interviews can provide a concrete, practical perspective on a legal 
issue. This is particularly necessary in new or developing areas of the law, as 
existing legal research and writing may be unable to offer this kind of perspective 
on the law.22  
 I have therefore gathered knowledge from key experts in the legal and 
medical fields by way of interviews to offer a richer perspective on silicosis and 
tuberculosis class actions in the South African gold mining sector. I interviewed 
Dr Rodney Ehrlich, a medical doctor who specialises in lung diseases, such as 
silicosis, silico-tuberculosis and pulmonary tuberculosis. Dr Ehrlich provided me 
with information regarding the manifestation and treatment (or lack thereof), of 
these diseases. I also spoke with Richard Spoor, a human rights attorney who 
specialises in occupational health and safety, and who is also one of the legal 
representatives of the Applicants in the Nkala class action. This qualitative 
research humanises the topic at hand, 23 and provides valuable insight into 
information gathered by experts who engage with silicosis and tuberculosis within 
                                                
20 Susan L. Turley ‘To See Between”: Interviewing as a Research Tool’ (2010) Journal of the 
Association of Legal Writing Directors 7 at 286.  
21 Ibid at 290-291. 
22 Ibid at 290. 
23 Ibid at 292. 
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the mining sector, be it through legal or medical practice.  
Chapter 2 
2.1  Understanding Silicosis 
 Miners contract silicosis by inhaling crystalline silica dust when working 
underground in gold mines.24. Crystalline silica is generated by various mining 
processes, including blasting and drilling for gold.25 Upon inhalation, silica dust 
particles are deposited in the lungs, whereafter these particles attack the cells of 
the lung, causing irreversible damage to the lung tissue, eventually causing 
irreparable scarring of the lungs.26 A person whose lungs have been damaged in 
this manner suffers lower breathing capacity and functioning, which eventually 
develops into the primary symptoms of silicosis.27 These symptoms include 
shortness of breath, chronic coughing and an overall depletion of the immune 
system and general health.28  
 The type of silicosis that a patient is diagnosed with, which can be either 
classic, accelerated or acute silicosis, depends on the amount of airborne silica 
dust that the patient is exposed to, as well as the length of exposure and the 
amount of fibrotic nodules which eventually attach to the lung tissue and cause 
scarring.29 
 The most common form of silicosis, the form that will be analysed in this 
paper, is known as classic ‘simple’ silicosis.30 Classic simple silicosis usually 
manifests after a person has been exposed to small amounts of silica dust on a 
                                                
24 Supra note 1 (Nkala) at para 12. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at paras 13-14.  
27 Ibid at paras 13-15. 
28 See Jaine Roberts ‘The Hidden Epidemic Among Former Miners: Silicosis, Tuberculosis and 
Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act in the Eastern Cape, South Africa’ (June 2009) 
Department of Health: Republic of South Africa 165 at 11, 74 and 98.  
29 Ibid at 6. 
30 Ibid at 7.  
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long-term basis, as gold miners often are.31 This form of silicosis manifests 
approximately 10 to 30 years after initial exposure to silica particles.32 Silicosis 
also increases its sufferers’ susceptibility to other microbial infections such as 
TB.33 Further complications of silicosis include being diagnosed with lung 
diseases generally, progressive massive fibrosis, ‘loss of vital capacity’ and lung 
cancer.34  
2.2  How Should Gold Mines Mitigate Silica Exposure? 
 By implementing certain measures, gold mining companies operating in 
South Africa are able to mitigate the degree of silica dust to which miners are 
exposed.35 
 These measures include: 
- Using cold water to water down areas filled with dust; 
- Watering down ‘foot and sidewalks with water and surfactants’ to prevent 
airborne dust; 
- Managing ventilation more effectively; 
- Installing filtration units which filter ‘respirable dust from the air’ before the 
dust enters the ‘air system’; and 
- Providing protective personal equipment in the form of dust masks. 36 
 In addition, all gold miners who work in conditions in which they are 
exposed to underground dust should at the very least undergo annual medical 
examinations in order to verify whether or not they have contracted silicosis, as is 
                                                
31 Ibid at 7.  
32 Occupational Health in the South African Mining Industry ‘Silicosis in South Africa: Fact Sheet 
2015’ (2015) Accessed on: 15 July 2016 Available at: http://www.oldcollab.co.za/information/fact-
sheets.  
33 Op cit note 28 (Roberts) at 7.  
34 Ibid at 6-7.  
35 Occupational Health in the South African Mining Industry ‘Silicosis in South Africa: Fact Sheet 
2015’ (2015) Available at: http://www.oldcollab.co.za/information/fact-sheets Date Accessed 15 
July 2016.  
36 Ibid. 
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required by section 25 of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 
(“ODIMWA”).37 These engineering controls mentioned above and medical 
examinations have been proven to mitigate or entirely prevent silicosis and other 
lung diseases.38 However, the various gold mining companies listed in Nkala 
were not effectively implementing these measures.39 This lad to the claim by the 
mineworkers in the matter that these companies were unlawfully exposing them 
to ‘excessive levels of harmful silica dust’, and that such exposure ultimately led 
to their silicosis and/or tuberculosis diagnoses.40  
 I interviewed Rodney Ehrlich, a former senior research scholar at the 
School of Public Health and Family Medicine at the University of Cape Town, and 
asked him about the measures that mining companies should be employing to 
prevent silicosis. Ehrlich stated the following: 
 
“There is no medical treatment of silicosis, which is the replacement of healthy 
lung tissue by fibrosis (scar tissue). [However], prevention of silicosis requires 
reduction of the amount of silica dust inhaled by miners. I have not seen 
evidence that dust respirators are a long-term solution underground, which puts 
the burden on reducing the amount of dust in the air ... Another solution is 
mechanisation, which involves the replacement of workers by equipment.  There 
has already been major shrinkage of the gold mining industry with attendant 
social repercussions (although not because of mechanisation).” 
 
 Ehrlich added that, in recent years, the Department of Minerals and 
Energy has started to publicise dust information obtained from certain mining 
companies.41 This data suggests that the percentage of dust concentrations in 
South African gold mines has started to decline to a level lower than the 
‘statutory silica dust occupational exposure limit’ over the past two decades — 
                                                
37 Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973; Section 25(1) of the ODIMWA 
states that ‘every person who performs risk work at a controlled mine or a controlled works shall 
be medically examined at such intervals as may be prescribed by the Minister.’ 
38 Supra note 1 (Nkala) at para 61.7. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid at para 59. 
41 Op cit note 4 (Ehrlich Interview). 
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since the implementation of the Mine Health and Safety Act of 199642.43 This 
decline can be attributed to both legislative and public pressures. For example: 
 
“Recent pressures to reduce dust concentrations underground (and in dusty 
surface operations) have come from the Mine Health and Safety Act (1996) 
which requires a number of actions in respect of disease surveillance and 
prevention; studies showing a very high prevalence of silicosis (dating from late 
1990s); the technical insolvency of the Compensation Fund under the 
Occupational Diseases and Mines and Works Act and the substantial hike in 
levies (insurance premiums) on mining companies; the ILO/WHO programme to 
eliminate silicosis (dating from 2003); lawsuits (dating from 2008) and the public 
sentiment in favour of justice linked to these lawsuits.”44 
 
 However, as noted by Ehrlich, even though the dust concentrations have 
declined over the past few years, this data still needs to be independently 
verified, which is problematic seeing as the State has limited resources to do 
this.45 The State should seriously consider allocating resources and funding 
towards such verification in order to prevent and avoid a future crisis of silicosis 
in South Africa. 
 
 Although mining companies now seem to be making progress towards 
mitigating silica exposure in mines by employing engineering and medical 
measures to try to prevent their employees from developing silicosis, the truth is 
that there are hundreds of thousands of former mineworkers in South Africa who 
are living with silicosis and/or TB and who need relief in the form of 
compensation. In fact, this figure is most likely an underestimate of the true 
number of people living with silicosis in South Africa today as a result of having 
worked in underground mines.46 
 
                                                
42 Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996.  
43 Op cit note 4 (Ehrlich Interview). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 See the South African OHS Commission ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into Safety and 
Health in the Mining Industry’ Volume 1 (1995) 1-192 at para 4.1.1.  
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 The primary reason so many mineworkers, including former and currently 
employed mineworkers, are living with occupational diseases today is to be 
found in a report by the Leon Commission.47 As noted by Ehrlich, ‘there was little 
pressure on the gold mining industry to control dust between the 1940s and the 
1990s. [Their] general view was that airborne dust concentrations had not fallen 
for 50 years, as stated in the 1996 Commission of Enquiry, although the actual 
evidence in the public domain of dust counts over this long period is scarce.’48 
The Leon Commission did indeed conclude that throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century, dust levels in South African gold mines remained 
approximately the same.49 
 
2.3 The Relationship Between Pulmonary Tuberculosis,  
 Silicosis, Silico-Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS 
 
 Pulmonary tuberculosis can be described as a bacterial lung disease, 
caused by inhalation of a bacterium referred to as ‘mycobacterium tuberculosis 
complex’, which is found in infected droplets of another person’s sputum or 
saliva, which find their way into the air when someone coughs, for example.50 
However, pulmonary tuberculosis, unlike silicosis, is often treatable and curable 
with antibiotics, especially when detected at an early stage.51 Silica dust, which 
eventually causes silicosis, increases a miner’s susceptibility to TB, meaning that 
mineworkers who are diagnosed with silicosis are therefore clearly more 
susceptible to TB infection.52 
 
 
                                                
47 Op cit note 4 (Ehrlich Interview).  
48 Ibid.  
49 Op cit note 46 (Leon Commission Report) at para 4.6.5. 
50 Supra note 1 (Nkala) at para 17. 
51 Ibid at paras 17 – 18.  
52 Ibid at para 18. 
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 When miners are diagnosed with both silicosis and tuberculosis, this 
condition is referred to as ‘silico-tuberculosis’.53 Research has confirmed a 
relationship between silicosis and pulmonary tuberculosis, which shows that 
‘workers who are exposed to silica dust have increased morbidity and mortality 
from PTB’ (pulmonary tuberculosis).54 There is however a lack of epidemiological 
evidence to prove whether or not miners who are exposed to silica dust, but 
whom have not developed silicosis, also have an increased risk of being 
diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis.’55 Nevertheless, Ehrlich explained that 
there is laboratory evidence proving that “silica particles impair the ability of the 
lung’s defence system.”56 This means that even if a mineworker does not have 
silicosis, it is likely that exposure to silica dust does indeed increase the miner’s 
risk of developing tuberculosis.57  
 This dissertation will not focus on an analysis of HIV/AIDS and 
mineworkers in South Africa, due to the fact that the class action suit does not 
provide for a class of mineworkers living with HIV/AIDS. However, it is important 
to note that although combatting silicosis and tuberculosis among mineworkers in 
South Africa is necessary, it should not overshadow the importance of 
addressing HIV infection among miners, given the fact that approximately 24% of 
mineworkers in South Africa were infected with HIV in 2009.58 This ‘triple 
epidemic’ of tuberculosis, silicosis and HIV is obviously fatal to mineworkers.59 
Decreasing HIV rates among miners could thus lead to a decrease in silicosis 
                                                
53 Op cit note 17 (Applicants’ Submissions) at para 7.  
54 Jill Murray and Eva Hnizdo ‘Risk of pulmonary tuberculosis relative to silicosis and exposure to 
silica dust in South African gold miners’ (1998) 55:7 Occupational and Environmental Medicine 
496 at 496. 
55 Ibid at 500.  
56 Op cit note 4 (Ehrlich Interview). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ehrlich et al ‘Incidence of Tuberculosis and HIV and Progression of Silicosis and Lung Function 
Impairment Among Former Basotho Gold Miners’ (2009) 52 American Journal of Industrial 
Medicine 901 at 902.  
59 Op cit note 4 (Ehrlich Interview). 
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and tuberculosis levels.60  
 It is also important to realise that currently employed mineworkers do have 
access to mining services, including medical services, while former mineworkers 
living with HIV/AIDS, and/or silicosis and/or TB do not; they depend on under-
resourced State health services, often located in rural South Africa and 
neighbouring countries and are therefore in an extremely vulnerable position.61 
The Leon Commission noted this in its published findings, stating that former 
mineworkers need to undergo regular examinations after retirement.62 Not only 
because these mineworkers may migrate back to other African countries, or 
other regions within South Africa, and be left without check-ups and necessary 
treatment, but also because silicosis may only manifest years after retirement.63 
 A large part of the legal inquiry in the class action suit will necessarily 
surround a discussion of these diseases and how they manifest. Hence defining 
these key concepts and analysing the relationship between silicosis, silico-
tuberculosis, pulmonary tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS within the South African gold 
mining industry is crucial. Although this chapter also outlined engineering and 
medical controls that mining companies should utilise in order to protect current 
and future employees from diseases, the class action suit in Nkala concerns ex-
miners who are already suffering from these diseases. The focus here is less 
prevention than legal remedy. The following chapters thus deal with the 
appropriate tests for factual causation that should be applied by the trial court in 
Nkala in order to assess whether or not the Applicants have grounds to be 
afforded a legal remedy in the form of compensation.  
 
                                                
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid.   
62 See op cit note 46 (Leon Commission Report) at para 4.1.4; and see Occupational Health in 
the South African Mining Industry ‘Silicosis in South Africa: Fact Sheet 2015’ (2015) Available at: 
http://www.oldcollab.co.za/information/fact-sheets Date Accessed 15 July 2016. 
63 See op cit note 46 (Leon Commission Report) at para 4.1.4. 
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Chapter 3  
3.1 The History of Silicosis and Tuberculosis Litigation in South 
 Africa 
 The number of former and current gold mineworkers living with silicosis 
and tuberculosis in South Africa has reached epidemic proportions.64 Hundreds 
of thousands of mineworkers in South Africa are suffering from the physical, 
psychological, economic and emotional effects of these diseases, not to mention 
those who have already passed away from silicosis and other complications.65  
 Moreover, it is not only these mineworkers who are experiencing the 
devastating consequences that these diseases bring to the fore. Dependants of 
mineworkers also endure various types of loss, including loss of loved ones and 
financial support.66 It is therefore paramount that South African courts hold 
mining companies to account, and that mining companies compensate 
mineworkers and their dependants for the harm suffered in the form of 
occupational diseases. It is also crucial that mining companies implement 
appropriate measures to minimise the manifestation of these diseases among 
current and future employees, and also provide adequate treatment to those 
already suffering from these diseases. 
 The South African gold mining industry began in 1886 on the 
Witwatersrand, colloquially referred to as “the Rand”.67 The gold mining sector 
contributed significantly to South Africa’s gross domestic product and the 
stabilisation of the South African economy.68 This was a period of economic 
growth and prosperity for many, including investors in the gold mining sector, but 
                                                
64 See Richard Spoor Inc Attorneys (2017) ‘About Silicosis’ Accessed on: 12/01/2017 Available 
at: http://goldminersilicosis.co.za/about-silicosis/.  
65 Supra note 1 (Lee) at para 1.  
66 Ibid at para 187.  
67 Ibid at para 1.  
68 Ibid.  
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it came at a cost for gold-mine workers who were diagnosed with silicosis, which 
was referred to as “phthisis”, as well as, in some cases, tuberculosis.69 
 Between the years 1902-1912, gold mining companies in the 
Johannesburg area of the Rand were confronted with a ‘silicosis crisis’.70 To 
combat this problem, these companies began to recognise silicosis as an 
occupational disease.71 In 1912, certain mining companies began compensating 
miners for silicosis, which led to the establishment of a compensation scheme for 
tuberculosis in 1916, for TB was recognised as a consequence of silicosis.72 
These companies also introduced measures to reduce silicosis and tuberculosis 
exposure within mines, thereby creating an ‘enviable reputation’ for themselves 
from the point of view of mining companies in other countries.73 These measures 
included ventilation systems and blasting and watering down mine surfaces, 
which ultimately directly affected the prevalence of silicosis in these mines.74 
 Although these mining companies exemplified a novel culture of fairness 
of treatment and protection for their employees, their actions clearly did not take 
root.75 It is argued that it is due to unfair treatment and poor protection of 
mineworkers that hundreds of thousands of miners in South Africa are either 
living with silicosis and/or tuberculosis, or have died as a result of these 
diseases, and they themselves, or their dependants, are hoping to be adequately 
compensated.76  
 2.1.1 The Mankayi Judgment 
 Fortunately, the silicosis and tuberculosis epidemic has come under legal 
                                                
69 Ibid.  
70 J McCulloch South Africa’s Gold Mines and the Politics of Silicosis (2012) Jacana Media (Pty) 
Ltd, South Africa at 2.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid. 
75 An analysis of the reasons why this is the case will be assessed in Chapter 3.  
76 See supra note 1 (Nkala) generally for a discussion of the dependants’ claims.  
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scrutiny in recent years. In 2006, Richard Spoor instituted a civil claim on behalf 
of Mr. Mankayi (“the plaintiff”) against Mr Mankayi’s former employer, AngloGold, 
(“the defendant”), for compensation for occupational diseases in the form of 
silicosis and pulmonary tuberculosis, which Mr. Mankayi had contracted while 
employed by AngloGold.77 The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a 
mineworker between the period 4 January 1979 to 11 September 1995, and 
alleged that he contacted silicosis and pulmonary tuberculosis during this time.78  
 Both silicosis and tuberculosis are compensatable occupational diseases 
under the ODIMWA, meaning that miners who are diagnosed with these 
diseases are entitled to compensation.79 However, Mankayi based his claim in 
delict, alleging that the defendant owed him ‘a duty of care under both the 
common law and statute to provide a safe and healthy environment in which to 
operate’ but breached this duty.80 This duty is embedded in the common law and 
the ODIMWA.81 The plaintiff further alleged that being exposed to silica dust, as 
well as certain gases, materially contributed to his development of TB and 
silicosis.82  
 On 3 March 2011, the Constitutional Court handed down its judgment in 
favour of Mr. Mankayi.83 The Mankayi judgment is a seminal piece of South 
African legal jurisprudence because it advances the right of all former 
mineworkers suffering from compensatable diseases under ODIMWA to claim 
delictual damages from former employers, albeit until contrary legislation is 
                                                
77 Georgina Jephson ‘The significance of the Constitutional Court’s decision in MANKAYI V 
ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD for former gold mineworkers who suffer from silicosis’ (November 
2012) Richard Spoor Inc Attorneys Accessed on: 20 July 2016 Available at: https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/jephson-summary-anglogold-ashanti-
lawsuit-nov-2012.pdf; Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti (126/2009) [2010] ZASCA 46(3) (31 March 
2009) at para 1. 
78 Supra note 2 (Mankayi) at para 1.  
79 Ibid at para 1. 
80 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti (126/2009) [2010] ZASCA 46(3) (31 March 2009) at para 2.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid at para 22.  
83 Supra note 2 (Mankayi) at para 112. 
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passed.84 The Constitutional Court’s decision has also made it possible for 
former mineworkers to institute legal proceedings to claim delictual damages on 
behalf of all other former gold miners living with silicosis and/or tuberculosis in 
the form of a class action suits.85  
 It is important to address the probable reasons why it took nearly a 
century since the legislative recognition of occupational diseases in mines for a 
mineworker to claim compensation for occupational diseases by way of the law 
of delict in South Africa.86 One has to begin by assessing section 35(1) of the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act87 (“COIDA”), which 
provides that: 
“No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for the 
recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in 
the disablement or death of such employee against such employee's employer, 
and no liability for compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save 
under the provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or death.”88 
 Section 35(1) of COIDA thereby prevented employees from bringing a 
damages claim against their employers, and also limited compensation to ‘that 
payable under COIDA’.89 However, section 100(2) of the ODIMWA precludes 
mineworkers, such as Mankayi, from compensation in terms of COIDA.90 The CC 
therefore held that COIDA does not apply to Mankayi, and that it is not irrational 
to preserve an employees’ common law claim against employees...’91 In doing 
so, this Court upheld its duty to protect the constitutional rights of delictual 
claimants and to give effect to the vindication of their human rights, including the 
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‘right to freedom and security of the person’, as per section 12 of the 
Constitution,92 that Mr Mankayi held.93 
Thus, the most obvious reason for the delay in bringing a damages claim was 
because of the assumption that ‘various Mines Acts’ (including COIDA, for 
example) precluded a claim for damages, which is why Mankayi had to first 
‘establish the right to sue his former employer’, before he could go ahead with his 
claim.94 A further reason it has taken so long for a delictual claim to be brought is 
arguably due to the lack of legal representation and access to courts for black, 
underprivileged persons, and hence also many mineworkers, during 20th century 
South Africa.   
Of course, the Constitution provides for a right of access to court under section 
34 of the Bill of Rights.95 Although this right exists in theory for all persons living 
in South Africa, it is not practically enforceable for all people, especially persons 
who are impoverished and thereby lack the means to finance their legal 
representation.96 Thus, this right was obviously not easily enforceable, neither in 
theory nor in practice, for many persons, prior to 1994. For example, during the 
1900s, black workers, including black mineworkers in South Africa, received a 
meagre minimum wage.97 As recently as 2012, the minimum wage for the gold 
industry was R3,500 per month.98 This lack of access to financial resources and 
consequent lack of access to courts was especially problematic during the early 
1900s and much of the apartheid era, because the Legal Aid Board, which 
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provides free legal services to those in financial need, was only established in 
1969,99 and neither was there was any resource, equivalent to legal aid, prior to 
this. 
 Yet access to justice still remains a systemic problem, for although South 
Africa does have a commendable public interest litigation sector,100 which 
includes Legal Aid, there is still a lack of legal representation in civil litigation 
matters in South Africa (including, of course, delict cases).101 This is so because 
the Legal Aid Board is not under a duty to provide free legal assistance in all civil 
matters.102 As stated by the Constitutional Court in Legal Aid South Africa v 
Magidiwana and Others:103 
‘The right to claim legal representation at state expense is limited to cases where 
substantial injustice would occur. Even where this right is available to an 
applicant, Legal Aid may still refuse to fund legal representation, if for example 
the applicant is a person who indisputably can afford to pay for legal 
representation.’104 
 Another barrier to access to justice and legal representation during the 
constitutional era may be a widespread lack of the necessary knowledge                 
of constitutional rights, and thereby the lack of enforcement of such rights.105 
Furthermore, as noted by Ehrlich, although occupational disease legislation 
dates back approximately a century, a study of 200 farm miners established that 
there was an unfamiliarity of the statutory compensation system and legislation 
among these miners, which reflects ‘the failure to educate black workers about 
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101 Ibid at 217. 
102 Legal Aid South Africa v Magidiwana and Others [2015] ZACC 28 at para 26. 
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their rights.’106 
 3.1.2 The Nkala Class Action Suit 
 In 2015, a historic number of gold-mine workers instituted an action for 
civil damages from their current and former employers on the basis of their 
silicosis and/or tuberculosis diagnoses.107 The Applicants sought an order for the 
certification of a single consolidated class action consisting of two classes: a 
silicosis class and a tuberculosis class.108 The Applicants sought to bring this 
class action on behalf of ‘past and current mineworkers who contracted silicosis 
or tuberculosis, and on behalf of the dependants of mineworkers who died of 
silicosis or tuberculosis contracted while employed in the gold mines’.109 In an 
unprecedented move in South African legal history on 13 May 2016, the South 
Gauteng High Court certified the class action application ‘in the interests of 
justice.’110 The Nkala High Court thus allowed all relevant parties to institute 
delictual a claim for compensation for silicosis and tuberculosis in the form of a 
class action suit.111  
 This class action will take place through a bifurcated process.112 The first 
class (“the silicosis class”) will consist of ‘current and former underground 
mineworkers who have contracted silicosis and the dependants of underground 
workers who died of silicosis (whether or not accompanied by any other 
disease)’.113 The second class (“the TB class”) will be comprised of ‘current and 
former underground mineworkers who have contracted pulmonary tuberculosis, 
and the dependants of deceased underground mineworkers who died of 
pulmonary tuberculosis (but excluding silico-tuberculosis), where such 
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mineworkers worked or have worked’ at one or more of the Respondent mining 
companies for at least two years.114 
 This class action suit is important because that it expedites the litigation 
process.115 It allows one or more plaintiffs to institute a claim on behalf of a group 
of persons, or a ‘class’, against one or more defendants, instead of each plaintiff 
bringing an individual claim to court.116 This process is beneficial for both 
plaintiffs and defendants, as it is more economical for plaintiffs to bring one 
action together, and it prevents defendants from being saddled with a multiplicity 
of actions.117  
 Shortly after the High Court certified the class-action suit, six mining 
companies appealed the High Court’s certification.118 The High Court dismissed 
the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”).119 
Yet the mining companies then applied for leave to appeal directly to the SCA.120 
This application was granted, and will be heard in 2017.121 These mining 
companies represent the Chamber of Mines in South Africa (African Rainbow 
Minerals, Anglo American South Africa, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, 
Harmony and Sibanye Gold), and were granted leave to appeal by the SCA ‘on 
all aspects of the certification by the South Gauteng High Court.’122  
 Furthermore, it is possible that the appeal procedure could find its way to 
the Constitutional Court, meaning that the class action matter, if certification is 
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upheld by the SCA or the CC, may take years before it is finally concluded.123 It 
is likely that the mining companies will exhaust all appeal procedures in an 
attempt to prevent the class action suit from going to trial, for if the mining 
companies are unsuccessful in such a matter, and ordered to pay compensation, 
the cost to them would be exorbitant.124 On the other hand, an alternative end to 
the matter would be for the mining companies to settle for a fair and just 
amount.125 
 The SCA could dismiss the application of the mining companies, allowing 
the potentially historic class action suit to go ahead, and may find in favour of the 
mineworkers. Such an outcome has the potential to allow for the compensation 
of hundreds of thousands of miners and their dependants, and for the vindication 
and recognition of miners’ constitutional rights to dignity, equality and non-
discrimination, life, bodily integrity and the right to a non-harmful environment.126  
Chapter 4 
4.1 The Applicants’ Cause of Action 
The Applicant mineworkers outlined their cause of action as follows: 
 1. That the Respondent mining companies owed them a duty of care (as 
 embedded in the common law and in certain statutes) to protect them from 
 harm in the workplace, and furthermore, that the Respondents are under 
 an obligation, in terms of section 8(2) of the Constitution, to protect the 
 Applicants’ constitutional rights;127 and  
 2. That the Respondent mining companies breached their duties of care 
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 by failing to take reasonable measures to protect their employees from 
 unlawful dust exposure, as well as the silicosis and tuberculosis risks that 
 necessarily resulted from such a breach, as well as violating certain 
 constitutional rights owed to the Applicants;128 and therefore 
 3. That the breach of these duties, and violation of these rights, entitles 
 the Applicants to adequate compensation at common law, and that the 
 Respondents should be liable in delict for the unlawful damage suffered by 
 the Applicants.129 
 This chapter discusses the delictual element of factual causation in light of 
the Lee judgment. It also provides reasons why the Lee judgment is precedent 
for tuberculosis compensation claims in the mining sector, and why the material 
contribution test should be used to assess factual causation in claims of the 
silicosis class.130  
4.2 Understanding Factual Causation in South African Law 
 In order for a plaintiff to be successful in his or her delictual claim, he or 
she must satisfy the element of factual causation as one of the elements of a 
delict in South African law.131 Causation invokes two separate inquiries: one 
inquiry into factual causation and one into legal causation. 132 This dissertation 
will focus on factual causation and the various tests relied on by South African 
and English courts in order to assess factual causation.   
 The purpose of the factual causation enquiry is to determine whether or 
not ‘the negligent act or omission caused the harm giving rise to the claim.’133 In 
other words, the enquiry is for deciding whether or not there is a link between the 
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act or omission in question and the harm sustained by the plaintiff.134 The most 
commonly regarded determinant of factual causation in South African law is the 
but-for test.135 The but-for test can be explained as follows:  
 ‘The test entails that one mentally eliminates the wrongful conduct which one 
 suspects was the cause of the harm and that one then asks what probably would 
 have happened if the lawful conduct had been substituted for the conduct which 
 had been eliminated. If the answer to this question is that the harm would have 
 occurred in any event, the conduct in question is not a cause of the harm. If the 
 answer is that it would not have occurred, the conduct complained of does 
 constitute a cause.’136 
 In the case of an omission on behalf of a defendant, the test involves a 
substitution of ‘a hypothetical positive act’ into the facts, and in this way requires 
mentally removing the defendant’s omission.137 Therefore, the but-for test entails 
a mental elimination of wrongful, positive conduct in the case of a commission, 
and a mental substitution of positive, lawful conduct in the case of an 
omission.138  
 This chapter focuses on omissions with regard to the test for factual 
causation, as the Lee judgment involved an omission on the part of the State.139 
Similarly, the Nkala suit is also likely to turn on a discussion of omissions on the 
part of the mining companies for failure to take action (in other words, their 
inaction) to take necessary measures to protect the Applicants from TB and 
silicosis.  
4.3 A Brief Outline of the Constitutional Court’s Judgment in Lee 
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 After being released from prison, Lee (“the plaintiff”) instituted a damages 
claim against the Department of Correctional Services, which was represented 
by the Minister of Correctional Services.140 Lee sued on the following basis:  
“[Mr Lee] alleged that the prison authorities had failed to take adequate 
precautions to protect him against contracting silicosis, [and] that he had 
contracted the illness in consequence of their omission ... [and that] the 
responsible authorities failed to take adequate, or any steps, to protect him 
against the risk of TB infection ’141 
 The plaintiff alleged that these omissions ‘violated ... [his] right to freedom 
and security of the person and the right to be detained under conditions 
consistent with human dignity, and to be provided with adequate 
accommodation, nutrition and medical treatment at State expense.’142  
 The Western Cape High Court found in favour of Lee.143 The Minister then 
appealed to the SCA, which upheld the appeal for insufficient proof of the claim   
that Lee would not have contracted TB had the prison in fact implemented a 
‘reasonably adequate system’ to prevent TB contagion among prisoners.144 Lee 
then appealed to the Constitutional Court.145 The key issue that the Constitutional 
Court faced was whether or not the delictual element of factual causation was 
satisfied.146 The CC held that factual causation was satisfied and therefore 
effectively overturned the SCA’s unanimous decision.147  
4.4 The Influence of the Lee Judgment on Factual Causation 
 The Constitutional Court’s verdict in Lee caused uncertainty with regard to 
the test for factual causation and the manner in which courts should be 
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addressing this delictual requirement.148 This is because it appears that the 
Constitutional Court did not apply the commonly used but-for test to assess 
factual causation in Lee, but rather applied a more ‘flexible’ legal approach to 
factual causation.149  
 Price notes that the Constitutional Court abandoned the orthodox but-for 
test in two significant ways.150 First, the Court seemed to accept that the factual 
causation element could be established ‘if a defendant’s negligent conduct 
increased the risk of the plaintiff’s harm, so that a smaller risk of harm would 
have existed had the defendant acted reasonably.’151 The Court stated that if a 
‘proper’ medical process and tuberculosis screening had been implemented and 
followed through, it was probable that Lee would not have contracted 
tuberculosis, and this warranted imposing delictual liability on the defendant.152 
Therefore, the first significant example of the majority’s departure from the 
orthodox test for factual causation occurred when the majority appeared                    
to confirm that factual causation would be founded if a defendant’s negligence 
‘increased the risk’ of harm to a plaintiff.153 
 This interpretation is analogous to the test that the House of Lords in 
McGhee used in order to analyse the element of factual causation in that 
matter.154 Indeed, the South African law of delict does differentiate between the 
‘material increase of risk’ test and ‘material contribution to harm’ test – otherwise 
known as the ‘material contribution’ test.155 The difference between the two tests 
is that the material contribution test investigates whether the defendant’s 
act/omission ‘caused or materially contributed’ to the harm suffered by the 
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plaintiff.156 However, the material increase of risk test assesses whether the 
defendant’s conduct increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, thereby creating 
an opportunity for harm to occur.157 
 The second significant manner in which the majority in Lee deviated from              
the orthodox but-for test was by stating the following: 
‘That in applying the but-for test, the court need not always ask itself whether the 
harm would hypothetically have been suffered had the defendant acted 
reasonably; that is, the court need not always substitute hypothetical reasonable 
conduct for the defendant’s actual conduct.’158  
 Substituting hypothetical, reasonable conduct for the conduct that the 
defendant omitted is an integral part of the but-for test, as explained above.159 
Nkabinde J in Lee supported abandoning such a substitution, which essentially 
amounts to abandoning the but-for test.160 Writing for the majority, Nkabinde J 
stated that courts are permitted, under the South African law of delict, to 
determine factual causation by asking ‘whether the factual conditions of Lee’s 
incarceration were a more probable cause of his tuberculosis, than that which 
would have been the case had he not been incarcerated in those conditions.’161 
 The CC concluded that failing to prove that the risk of tuberculosis 
contagion to Lee would have been entirely eliminated had the defendants acted 
lawfully did not prevent factual causation from being satisfied, for factual 
causation would nevertheless be satisfied if it could be proved that ‘the risk of 
contagion would have been reduced by proper systemic measures’, and not 
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necessarily eliminated any risk entirely.162  
4.5 A Discussion of the ‘Material Increase of Risk’ Test 
 In Fairchild, three appeals came before the House of Lords.163 Each 
appeal concerned cases in which employees had developed mesothelioma from 
exposure to asbestos dust at their workplaces.164 The House of Lords held that a 
claimant who is able to prove that his or her mesothelioma was caused by 
exposure to asbestos dust, but where this exposure was the contribution of more 
than one employer, then the conclusion is that each defendant who ‘materially 
increased the risk of the claimant’s contracting the disease contributed to his 
injury’, which thereby justified a ‘modified approach to proof of causation’.165  
 Assessing the increase in risk in the matter was therefore important to 
concluding whether or not the omissions of the employer in Fairchild were the 
factual cause of the harm suffered by the claimant.166 The Applicant mineworkers 
in Nkala, by analogy of this reasoning, should be permitted to rely on proof of a 
material increase of risk to prove that the omissions of the Respondent mining 
companies were the factual cause of their harm. The Court in McGhee, a prior 
case confirmed by Fairchild, explained the material increase of risk test as 
follows: 
‘If it is an established fact that the conduct of a particular kind creates a risk that 
injury will be caused to another or increases an existing risk that injury will ensue, 
and if the two parties stand in such a relationship that the one party owes a duty 
not to conduct himself in that way; and if the first party does conduct himself in 
that way; and if the other party does suffer injury of the kind to which the risk 
related; then the first party is taken to have caused the injury by his breach of 
duty, even though the existence and extent of the contribution made by the 
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breach cannot be ascertained.167  
 If we contrast this test with the but-for test, it is clear that the but-for test 
necessitates a higher standard of proof than that which is required by the 
material contribution of risk test as determinant of factual causation.168 The but-
for test requires a plaintiff to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there was 
at least a 51% chance that the harm would have been eliminated had the 
defendant’s omission or commission not occurred.169 If we apply this to             
the class action suit, the onus on the mineworkers would be to prove that              
the employers’ breach of their common law and statutory duties increased their 
risk of developing silicosis and/or becoming infected with TB by at least 51%.170  
 As stated by Spoor, “it cannot be the case that the employer’s breach has 
to have increased the risk of disease by more than 50% before it can be held 
liable.”171 This alludes to one of the criticisms of the but-for test, namely that it is 
an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach which leads to unfair outcomes because it relies on a 
mathematical, statistical approach, which the but-for test should not be based 
on.172 The but-for test is, and should be, based on common-sense reasoning 
infused with ‘everyday-life experiences’ to analyse factual causation in a given 
matter.173 
 Furthermore, the CC’s reference to the duty of care owed by the State to 
inmates in Lee provides a useful explanation for why the but-for test should not 
be applied to the tuberculosis class. As noted, the CC accepted that ‘a 
reasonably adequate system may not have “altogether eliminated the risk of [TB] 
contagion,”’ and added that this should not, however, lead to the conclusion that 
the prison authorities had no duty to reduce the risk of tuberculosis contagion in 
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prison.174  
 The CC noted that ‘it would be enough … to satisfy the probable factual 
causation where the evidence establishes that the plaintiff found himself in the 
kind of situation where the risk of contagion would have been reduced by proper 
systemic measures.’175 If the relevant court hearing the Nkala class action 
decides that the ‘material increase of risk’ test should be used to prove that the 
Respondent mining companies were the factual cause of the Applicants’ harm, 
then the element of factual causation will be satisfied, if it can be proved that: 
1. The conduct of each mining company created a risk of injury to its 
employees; or if it is proved that the Respondent mining companies 
increased an already existing risk (in other words, that the mining 
companies materially increased the risk suffered by the mineworkers); 
and that 
2. Each mining company owes a duty of care to its employees, and 
finally; 
3. That the Applicant mineworkers did in fact become infected with 
pulmonary tuberculosis. 
 If all of the above is proved, the conclusion is that the mining companies 
have factually caused the Applicants’ injuries, even if the extent of the mining 
companies’ negligence is not ascertainable.176 In brief, it is argued that the 
aforementioned test of ‘material increase of risk’ will be a fair standard in the 
matter, and should apply to the TB class. In other words, if the trial court agrees 
that assessing the possible increase of risk is the correct factual causation 
standard to be applied to TB class, then this will mean that the TB class of 
mineworkers do not have to prove that the company’s negligence caused their 
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occupational disease in a but-for manner, but rather that it increased the risk of 
them becoming infected with TB.177 
4.6  Which Test for Factual Causation Should Apply to the 
 Silicosis Class? 
 The silicosis class will include mineworkers, both ‘former and current, who 
suffer from silicosis, as well as the dependants of mineworkers who have died 
from the disease (whether or not accompanied by any other disease).’178 This 
means that this class may include mineworkers who have been diagnosed with 
both silicosis and tuberculosis, meaning those who suffer from silico-
tuberculosis.179  
Price argues that the silicosis class is probably going to be regulated by the 
following principle applied in Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw 1956 AC 513: 
That ‘a plaintiff can hold a defendant liable whose negligence has materially 
contributed to a totality of loss resulting partly from the acts of other persons or 
from the forces of nature, even though no precise allocation of portion of the loss 
to the contributing factors can be made.’180 
 Price notes that this principle can be interpreted as ‘the but-for test or as 
an alteration to it’ in the form of “‘material contribution’ to harm”181 and therefore 
not a material increase of risk, as should be applied to the TB class. Price argues 
that it is likely that, in order to prove a factual link in the matter, the silicosis class 
will not have to rely on Lee, and that ‘each employer could be held liable only for 
the approximate extent of a claimant’s silicosis that the former’s negligence had 
caused or contributed to on a balance of probability.’182 The material contribution 
test thereby allows for a defendant to be held fully liable (in other words, to pay 
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the full amount of compensatory damages to a plaintiff), even though it can only 
be proved that the defendant contributed to the harm.183 
 
 In Nkala, the mineworkers conceded that proving factual causation in the 
TB class would be difficult because of the nature of the disease and the fact that 
it is difficult to prove the ‘direct or actual cause of the harm suffered,’ which 
creates an evidential problem for this class.184 This is a reason why the trial court 
should be able to rely on the Lee judgment, and the Constitutional Court’s 
development of the but-for test, to assess factual causation in the TB class.185   
 This evidential burden is made more difficult by the fact that silica dust is 
not the only risk factor to TB infection, but that ‘tobacco smoking, positive HIV 
infection, [and] cramped and poor living conditions’ are known to be risk factors 
to TB infection.186 The combined effect of HIV infection and silicosis makes a 
mineworker sixteen times more likely to develop tuberculosis and also greatly 
enhances the risk of a miner developing recurrent silicosis, which occurs when a 
mineworker suffers a later occurrence of tuberculosis.187  
 However, the question of the cause of the disease is not an evidential 
hurdle for the silicosis class, as silicosis is a progressive disease because the 
symptoms of silicosis worsen over time and cause irreparable harm, even after 
exposure to silica dust has ceased.188 Thus, silica dust is the ‘only cause’ of 
silicosis, whereas inhaling silica dust ‘increases the risk’ of TB infection, but does 
not cause this infection.189 The nature of silicosis therefore allows for a factual 
link to be made between the defendant’s conduct and the harm in the form of a 
contribution to that harm, because had the mineworker not worked for the mine, 
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and had the mine protected its mineworkers from silica exposure, the mineworker 
would not have developed silicosis, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that 
the mining company’s conduct contributed to the disease.190  
 
 Thus, assessing whether or not a defendant has contributed to the 
disease can be easily ascertained if the employee had worked for one single 
mining company during his career, for then it will be easy to prove that the 
silicosis manifested during the mineworker’s time working at that specific mine.191 
However, even if a mineworker worked for multiple mining companies, the 
material contribution test would allow for each mining company to be held liable 
for the extent of their contribution to the harm suffered by a plaintiff.192  
 
4.7 Alternatives to the But-For Test with Regard to the TB   
 Class 
 The TB class will include ‘current and former underground mineworkers 
who have or had contracted pulmonary tuberculosis and the dependants of 
deceased mineworkers who died of pulmonary tuberculosis, where such 
mineworkers worked or have worked for at least two years on one or more of the 
gold mines listed...’193 The TB class is therefore limited to mineworkers and their 
dependants who were or are only infected with TB and not infected with silico-
tuberculosis.194  
 Seeing as Lee’s claim was vindicated, the question becomes: Are the 
factual circumstances in Lee analogous to those of the Applicant mineworkers, 
thereby warranting an abandonment of the but-for test? Although the majority in 
Lee did emphasise the flexibility of the but-for test, it did not entirely do away with 
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it.195 Instead, the implications of the majority’s decision are that the test will in all 
likelihood be relaxed in specific instances only, and not as a general rule.196  
 Due to the fact that the CC’s jurisprudence in Lee has led to much 
confusion within legal academia and practice in South Africa, we rely on the 
interpretations of legal scholars to make sense of the degree of importance, and 
the role that the Lee judgment will play in future cases, such as the Nkala class 
action suit. For example, Price interprets the CC’s Lee judgment to imply that the 
relaxed traditional but-for test will in all likelihood be applied to certain 
‘exceptional’ cases, such as matters involving evidentiary gaps.197  
 Another exceptional circumstance, as noted by Fagan, would arise if 
application of the but-for test would cause an ‘injustice’, as stated by the CC in 
Lee.198 Fagan notes that there are in fact cases in which the strict application of 
the [but-for] rule would result in an injustice, hence a requirement of flexibility.’199 
Yet the CC failed to explain which kinds of injustices would merit a more flexible 
approach to factual causation, and this creates difficulties in applying this test in 
this manner.200  
4.8 Evidential Gaps as an ‘Exceptional circumstance’ in the TB 
Class 
 The CC in Lee noted that the application of the but-for test to delict cases 
which involve evidentiary gaps, or successive/multiple causes, is unjustifiable.201 
Furthermore, Cameron J, writing for the minority in Lee, also noted that the 
inflexibility of the but-for test is problematic cases involving evidentiary gaps.202  
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 Evidentiary gaps are created when there are multiple potential causes to a 
plaintiff’s harm, in other words, multiple employers who may have caused the 
harm, which can occur either simultaneously or successively.203 Price notes that 
there could potentially be two sub-classes within the TB class.204 These two 
classes could potentially consist of mineworkers suffering from TB after negligent 
exposure ‘to excessive silica dust by only a single employer’, on the one hand, 
and a second class involving mineworkers who developed TB from exposure by 
multiple employers, on the other hand.205 In this second potential class, each 
employer could be the potential cause of the mineworkers’ harm.206  
 
 Applying the but-for test to cases involving successive causes is 
problematic because of the difficulty in proving factual causation by way of the 
but-for test in these kinds of matters.207 The following examples expose the 
problems created by applying the but-for test to cases of successive causes and 
evidentiary gaps: 
‘Two cars. D1 and D2 are hitwomen independently employed to destroy C1’s car. 
Each places a small explosive device near C1’s car. The devices explode, but 
only one device destroys C1’s car, whilst the other device destroys C2’s car. It 
cannot be determined which D’s device destroyed which car.’208 
 Using the but-for test in order to establish causation in this scenario would 
lead to an outcome in which neither D1 nor D2 could be held liable for the 
destruction of C1’s car.209 The reason for this is that, on a balance of 
probabilities, there is an equal chance that either one of the defendants caused 
the harm, and therefore that both defendants would be absolved of liability 
because the element of factual causation would not be fulfilled on the but-for 
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test.210 This outcome would leave the claimant without a legal remedy, which 
seems both legally and morally unfair based on any right-minded person’s 
intuition regarding the facts above.211 
 Similarly, imagine an underground mineworker in South Africa works for 
two gold mining companies, Company A and Company B, over a 6-year period, 
for periods of 3 years, respectively. The mineworker, while working at Company 
B, is diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis. If we were to apply the but-for test 
to this scenario, both mining companies would, like the two cars in the 
aforementioned scenario, be absolved from liability. It would be impossible with 
this test to prove on a balance of probabilities whether or not the mineworker 
developed TB while working for company A or company B, or both. The 
mineworker and/or his dependants would be left without compensation, an 
untenable legal position.  
 The two examples above highlight the problems presented by the but-for 
test. These scenarios are examples of delict cases involving evidentiary gaps, 
which represent one of the instances where the revised factual causation test in 
Lee will be justified.212 Examples of cases involving evidentiary gaps are 
characterised by factual scenarios whereby a claimant lacks the evidence to hold 
one employer to account, because the cause of the employee’s infection cannot 
be proved, on a balance of probabilities, by simply applying the but-for test.213  
 In other words, an employee would be able to prove that each employer 
may have contributed towards the risk of infection, but will necessarily be unable 
to prove exactly which employee did so.214 As noted, this will often be the case if 
an employee is employed at two or more workplaces, and then becomes infected 
with TB, but fails to successfully hold one employer accountable for the harm on 
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the basis of the but-for test, thus justifying the use of a different test.215 
Therefore, it is submitted that abandoning the but-for test in favour of the 
‘material increase of risk’ test in Lee, is justified in respect of the first sub-class 
(those mineworkers who have worked for multiple employers).216  
 However, the minority of the CC in Lee also relied on the shortcomings of 
the but-for test in the context of ‘evidentiary gaps’ cases to justify abandoning this 
test in the case.217 The Court explained that, because tuberculosis is caused by a 
‘single fibre’, and because Lee could have been infected by a number of people, 
including prison guards, fellow inmates, or even a visitor, it ‘defies the but-for 
test’, for it is impossible to conclude which one of those persons was the cause of 
Lee’s infection.218 This clearly points to the specific evidentiary gap in the Lee 
case.219  
 It is argued that similar evidentiary gaps will undoubtedly present 
themselves within the first TB sub-class of mineworkers who will find it very 
difficult to prove, in terms of the but-for test, the direct cause of their infection.220 
If follows that abandoning the but-for test with reference to that specific class is 
also justified.221 
4.9  Systemic Omissions by Mining Companies as an ‘Exceptional 
Circumstance’ 
 The above section explained why the but-for test should not apply to the 
first TB sub-class.222 It will now be argued that the systemic omissions of the gold 
mining companies implicated in the Nkala judgment also qualify as an 
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exceptional circumstance, and that this fact justifies an abandonment of the but-
for test with reference to both of the TB sub-classes.  
 An example of an ‘exceptional circumstance’ in which a court may be 
permitted, following Lee, to abandon the but-for test, would be if a plaintiff claims 
that his or her harm was caused by systemic omissions on behalf of the State.223                     
In other words, an exceptional circumstance would arise if ‘the state has failed to 
perform a positive constitutional obligation to design and implement a reasonable 
system to protect a vulnerable class of people against a genuine risk to their life 
and personal security; and that risk eventuates.’224 The CC thereby also       
focused on the positive constitutional duty placed on the State, as per section 
7(2) of the Constitution, to protect the rights of all persons, including prisoners.225 
 A primary reason why the Constitutional Court decided to apply the 
relaxed test for factual causation to prisoners such as Lee was on the basis of 
the ‘positive constitutional duty’ on the State, found in section 7(2) of the 
Constitution, to act in a manner that promotes the protection of the rights 
contained within the Bill of Rights.226 The Court in part justified its relaxation of 
the ‘but-for’ test by focusing on the vulnerability and lack of autonomy of 
prisoners and the negligent omissions on the part of the State.227 For example, 
the Court stated that on a more onerous test for factual causation, ‘it is unlikely 
that any inmate will ever overcome the hurdle of causation’ and thereby also not 
have a remedy at their disposal.228 Importantly, it also invoked the constitutional 
obligations on the State to protect prisoners’ constitutional/human rights, namely 
the right to bodily integrity,229 dignity,230 and the right to be detained in conditions 
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that are consistent with human dignity.231 
 The majority of the CC, in justifying its decision to depart from the 
orthodox test for factual causation in Lee, accounted for the lack of autonomy 
and the vulnerability of prisoners in South Africa, in particular, their living 
conditions, and the power and responsibility of the State.232 Although the State’s 
power is derived from statutes and the Constitution, and therefore exists 
independently of the vulnerability of prisoners, this power is even more 
pronounced when it is considered in light of the prisoners’ vulnerability, because 
the differences in the societal positioning and relative power of the two groups is 
particularly distinct.  
 This section posits as its premise an undeniable similarity between the 
vulnerable positions that both mineworkers and prisoners experience in society, 
the power yielded by the State and South African gold mining companies, and 
the constitutional obligations that the State and such companies owe to their 
employees – especially to underground mineworkers. This congruity supports the 
claim that the factual circumstances of the Applicant mineworkers, while in the 
mining companies’ employ, is an exceptional circumstance that exempts them 
from having to rely on the but-for test to prove a causative link in their matter, and 
that a lower standard, the ‘material increase of risk’ test, should apply instead. 
4.9.1 Understanding the Vulnerability of Mineworkers in South 
Africa with Reference to their Work and Living Conditions 
 TB is an ‘airborne communicable disease’ and is easily transmitted in 
badly ventilated, crowded and confined areas, such as in Pollsmoor prison233 and 
in mineworkers’ barracks and hostels.234 Lee and his fellow inmates were living in 
close proximity to each other in their prison cells for up to 23 hours per day, 
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which created ‘ideal conditions for transmission’.235 Although the Applicant 
mineworkers naturally had greater freedom of movement compared to the 
restricted physical freedom of prisoners such as Lee, these mineworkers did live 
in various forms of accommodation; either miners’ barracks, hostels, compounds 
or dormitories, which were often unhygienic and overcrowded.236  
 
 These living conditions also played a role in aggravating the TB infections 
plaguing gold mineworkers in South Africa – to those who have developed 
silicosis and to those who have not, for exposure to silica dust, in the absence of 
full-blown silicosis, increases risk of tuberculosis infection.237 It is arguable that 
the gold-mining companies had the resources and the power to create better 
living conditions for these mineworkers, in order to prevent a spread of TB and 
silico-tuberculosis, but this did not happen. Instead, the mineworkers were left 
susceptible and vulnerable to TB infection and the development of silico-
tuberculosis.238 
 
 In a similar vein, the Respondents wielded ‘complete control over all 
aspects of the working environment on the mines.’239 These mining companies 
should have ensured that they were complying with their common law and 
legislative duties to protect mineworkers from occupational diseases, but it is 
alleged that these duties were not adhered to.240  
 The vulnerable positions of the Applicant mineworkers were especially 
pronounced in the latter half of the 20th century, when many of these 
mineworkers lived in great poverty and relied on meagre wages and income from 
agricultural output, which did not provide them with a decent standard of living.241 
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This poverty spurred on a vicious cycle of malnutrition, making these 
mineworkers even more susceptible to TB.242 The current TB and silicosis 
epidemic amongst mineworkers in South Africa is in large part due to the abuse 
of power by the Respondent mining companies and the vulnerability of miners.243  
 Of course, mineworkers are at their most vulnerable when they have been 
diagnosed with silicosis and/or TB.244 Many mineworkers have become, or will 
become, disabled from these diseases, which essentially prevents them from 
taking up gainful employment.245 This forces these people into lives of poverty, 
often in rural areas where access to legal resources and medical assistance is 
scarce.246  
 The Applicants’ submissions stated that they ‘may ask the trial court to 
develop the law on the onus of proof for negligence and causation’.247 If the trial 
court allows for this development, and applies the material increase of risk test to 
the TB classes, then this would accord with both the minority and majority in Lee, 
which shows the ‘willingness’ of the Constitutional Court to ‘adapt and develop 
the principles of the law of delict so as to ensure that vulnerable classes are 
given fair treatment.’248  
 This treatment would be fair because even though all persons should be 
treated equally before the law, South African law, including our courts, responds 
differently to vulnerable groups of people. For example, in matters relating to 
children, who are viewed as a vulnerable group in South African law, the ‘best 
interests of the child’ are paramount;249 and refugees are also afforded special 
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legal protection due to their vulnerability.250 Similarly, our courts should regard 
mineworkers who suffer from occupational diseases and/or HIV/AIDS as a 
vulnerable group of persons and should respond appropriately. An appropriate 
response would be to apply the material increase of risk test to the TB class. 
4.9.2 The Constitutional Obligations of the State and Mining 
Companies – A Comparison Between Public and Private 
Entities  
 As noted in Nkala, a large part of the class action suit will focus on the 
infringement of certain fundamental constitutional rights by the mining companies 
since 1994, and the constitutional obligations that the mining companies owe to 
their employees to respect their constitutional rights.251 As noted above, an 
interpretation of Lee may be that the but-for test should be relaxed in instances 
where the State is liable for a systemic omission and has therefore failed to fulfil 
its constitutional obligations to provide a safe and reasonable healthcare system 
in prisons.252 Similarly, the relaxed test for causation should also be applied to 
both of the TB classes, for it is arguable that the Respondent companies should 
be liable for systemic omissions and the failure to fulfil their constitutional 
obligations to their employees.253 
 The constitutional duties placed on the mining companies to respect the 
constitutional rights of their employed miners is the third set of duties, in addition 
to the common law and statutory duties, which the mining companies owe to their 
employees and also those former employees employed since 1994.254 The 
                                                
250 Union of Refugee Women and Others v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority and Others (CCT 39/06) [2006] ZACC 23; 2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 537 
(CC) (12 December 2006) at para 29. 
251 Op cit note 1 (Nkala) at para 58.3. 
252 Op cit note 145 (Price) 497. 
253 Op cit note 1 (Nkala) at para 58.3. 
254 See note 1 (Nkala) at para 58 for a discussion of these duties.   
44	  
constitutional rights alleged to have been breached by these companies are:255 
 1. The right to human dignity, as expressed in section 10 of the 
Constitution. Human dignity is arguably the highest-ranking right in the Bill of 
Rights, as it is also a founding value contained in section 1 of the Constitution, 
which states that the Republic of South Africa is founded on the values of ‘human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms.’256 The right to human dignity is not only a free-standing constitutional 
right, but it is trite that it also forms the ‘source’ of other constitutional rights, such 
as the right to freedom and security of the person.257 The right to human dignity 
also requires that all persons respect the ‘intrinsic worth of all people’.258  
 2. The right to an environment not harmful to [the mineworkers’] health 
and well-being, as expressed in section 24 of the Constitution. The right to dignity 
and the right to a non-harmful environment are interlinked in this matter.259 For as 
stated by the High Court in Nkala, after perusing the evidence attested to in the 
affidavits of the mineworkers, it is consistently revealed ‘that the mining 
companies stripped them of their dignity, and concomitantly compromised their 
health and safety, with such intensity and ferocity that they were effectively 
dehumanised’.260  
 3. ‘The fundamental right against unfair discrimination by private persons’, 
as expressed in section 9(4): ‘No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone’ on certain grounds listed in terms of section 9(3). In 
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President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo,261 the CC 
explained that: 
“At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the 
purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a 
society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect 
regardless of their membership of particular groups.”262 
 4. The right to life, as expressed in section 11 of the Constitution. The right 
to life, similar to the right to dignity as explained above, is one of the founding 
values in section 1 of the Constitution. The right to life is given to all persons and 
is ‘textually unqualified’ in that section 11 states that ‘everyone has a right to 
life’.263  
 5. The right to bodily integrity, as expressed in sections 12(1)(c) and 12(2) 
of the Constitution.264 This right falls under the right to freedom and security of 
the person.265 As explained in Mankayi, this right is ‘engaged’ when a person ‘is 
subjected to some form of injury deriving from either a public or a private 
source.’266 According to the Court in Mankayi, this right is claimable by any 
person, and both private and public bodies should protect persons from 
infringement of this right.267  
 It is alleged by the mineworkers that the mining companies infringed their 
rights to life and bodily integrity ‘by unduly exposing them to disease and 
death’.268 The Applicants further alleged that the existing common law not only 
infringes their right to dignity, but also their rights to equality, life, ‘freedom and 
security of the person’ and the right to a non-harmful environment, among 
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others.269  
 4.9.2.1 Negative and Positive Constitutional Obligations 
 In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden,270 which concerned 
alleged police negligence, the SCA remarked on the difference between the 
constitutional obligations that the Constitution imposes on the State, as a public 
entity, and the obligations imposed upon private citizens.271 The Court stated that 
although private citizens may be ‘entitled to remain passive when the 
constitutional rights of others are under threat’, the State, as a public entity, is 
under an express obligation per section 7(2) of the Constitution to ensure that the 
rights contained within the Bill of Rights are free of unlawful infringement.272  
 The SCA added that the legal apprehension towards imposing liability for 
omissions is often influenced by a noninterventionist idea of liberty, recognising 
that individuals are permitted to “‘mind their own business’” and not intervene in 
situations even if they may be reasonably expected to prevent the occurrence of 
harm.273 The State, on the other hand, is not let off as easily, for it is often the 
‘very business’ of a public enterprise to protect the best interests of the public.274 
 Another reason that the State’s duties are more explicit within the 
Constitution is because of the power that the State yields, and the resources that 
it has at its disposal to curb abuses of power between citizens. For example, the 
reason the State was held to account in Van Duivenboden was that it acted 
negligently in failing to prevent the use of firearms in the matter – a power it has 
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in terms of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969.275 Not only does the State 
have the power to act to prevent harm – but it also has immense power to wield 
harm. 
 Yet section 8(2) of the Constitution also places legal obligations on private 
parties, such as mining companies, to respect certain rights contained in the Bill 
of Rights.276 Section 8(2) of the Constitution states that ‘a provision of the Bill of 
Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by 
the right.’ This means that the Bill of Rights not only applies vertically between 
the State and private parties, as per section 7(2) of the Constitution, but also 
applies horizontally between two or more private parties.277 The Constitution 
therefore also places duties on private persons to respect each other’s 
constitutional rights in their interactions with one another.278  
 The primary difference between the State’s constitutional obligations, per 
section 7(2) of the Constitution, and private parties’ obligation, as per section 
8(2), is that the former encompasses both a positive and a negative obligation, 
and the latter a negative obligation only.279 This means that the State has an 
obligation to work towards the fulfilment of the constitutional rights of private 
persons, as well as to prevent the infringement of such rights, but that private 
parties only have an obligation not to infringe upon the constitutional rights of 
private persons.280  
 Although the constitutional obligations, which the State owed to Lee, were 
more onerous than the duties of the mining companies, both parties were 
nevertheless under an obligation not to infringe upon the rights of the respective 
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private persons. The positions of the State and mining companies in this sense 
are thus analogous. For example, in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary 
School & Others v Essay N.O. and Others,281 the Constitutional Court noted that 
section 8(2) of the Constitution places a negative obligation on private parties 
‘not to interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a right.’282 In this manner, the 
mining companies have a duty not to interfere with the rights of dignity, equality, 
life, bodily integrity and environment of the mineworkers.283  
 It is important to note that the South African Companies Act284 (“the Act”) 
includes a provision to ensure that section 8(2) of the Constitution, and the 
horizontal application of constitutional rights, is expressed throughout the Act.285                    
Section 7 highlights the Act’s purposes, which include promoting, among 
companies, a ‘compliance with the Bill of Rights.’286 This provision is a reaction to 
the demand for human rights issues to be at the forefront of corporate policy-
making and to become an integral part of ‘the holistic functioning of the 
company.’287 This is a welcome development, for it challenges the traditional 
view of human rights issues as barriers to company profits and growth. 288 
 Constitutional rights should bind both the state and private parties, 
because the possibility of infringing these rights arises from acts and omissions 
by the State and private parties.289 In Khumalo v Holomisa,290 the Constitutional 
Court – deciding whether or not a right could find ‘direct horizontal application’ in 
the matter and whether section 8(2) applies to private parties – took into account 
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the ‘intensity of the right’, together with the ‘potential invasion of that right’, and 
that such invasion could occur by the acts or omissions of private parties.291 
 In fact, certain commentators argue that private parties are, in certain 
instances, capable of causing even greater harm to others than governments.292 
An example of this is the manner in which South African gold mines, including 
the Respondent mining companies, operated prior to 1994, which can be 
described as one of the ‘most socially destructive practices’ of the 1900s. 293 This 
is arguably why there are so many mineworkers who are currently suffering from 
mining-related diseases. It is therefore clear that the ‘potential invasion’ of the 
rights alleged to have been breached by the mining companies is extreme, which 
justifies the imposition of constitutional obligations on the mining companies.  
 Further examples of corporate violations of delictual and constitutional 
duties towards their employees include basic human rights violations, such as 
‘abusive labour practices ... or violations of the fundamental rights to equality, 
dignity and freedom.’294 These constitute a plain infringement of the ‘duty not to 
cause harm’.295 In fact, there has, in recent years, been a global move towards 
holding private entities, such as companies, liable for human rights abuses,296 
and the class action suit is a prime example of this.  
 Therefore, although the constitutional obligations of the State and private 
parties do not overlap entirely, the negative duties placed on both parties are 
similar enough to argue that the State and mining companies do both owe 
constitutional obligations to private persons.297 The aforementioned similarities 
                                                
291 Ibid at para 33.  
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between the powerful positions of the State and mining companies, and their 
analogous constitutional obligations, as well as the vulnerability of prisoners and 
mineworkers, are the primary reasons why the Applicant mineworkers constitute 
a vulnerable class of persons. This is also the reason why the systemic 
omissions on the part of the Respondent mining companies should be deemed 
an ‘exceptional circumstance’ with regard to factual causation. The consequence 
of this is that the Applicants should not be required to prove factual causation               
on the basis of the but-for test, and the relevant court should use the             
material contribution of risk test to assess the factual causation in the scenario 
instead.  
 The application of the test for factual causation in Lee would also be in the 
interests of justice, as it allows for the mineworkers to vindicate constitutional 
rights with a claim in delict. In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,298 which 
was heard during the period when the Interim Constitution still applied, the 
Constitutional Court stated that an award of damages is a suitable remedy for the 
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.299 Similarly, in Law Society of 
South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC), the Court, after 
drawing on the Fose judgment, stated that granting a private law remedy in delict 
by way of an order of compensation protects and enforces constitutional rights.300 
Chapter 5 
5.1 The Common Law and Statutory Duties of Care  
 The following section will provide an analysis of the statutory and common 
law duties of care, which are owed by the mining companies to the underground 
mineworkers who were and still are in their employment.301 Proving a duty of 
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care is a requirement of the material contribution of risk test, which should apply 
to the TB class, and is also required to prove material contribution on the part of 
an employer.302 For as stated in Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw 1956 AC 513, 
‘the employee ... must make it appear that, at least on a balance of probabilities, 
the breach of duty caused or materially contributed to his injury.’303  
5.1.2  A Brief Explanation of the Duty of Care 
 The Applicant mineworkers allege that the mining companies, by way of 
their negligence, upheld an ‘on-going, relentless, intense and profound’ practice 
of neglect, evidence of which is still to be put forth by the Applicants in order to 
prove that these mining companies breached the legal duties owed to them while 
they were in the employment of the companies.304 
 In order to contextualise the duty of care that the mining companies owe 
to their underground mineworkers, it must be asked how exactly the mining 
companies have breached their duties – from what harm should these mining 
companies have sought to protect their employees?305 The duty of care that the 
mining companies owe to their employees in this instance is a duty to protect 
mineworkers from silicosis, silico-tuberculosis and pulmonary tuberculosis.306  
  Furthermore, this duty of care is twofold; it consists of common law and 
statutory duties placed on mining companies to protect their employees from 
occupational diseases.307 If a mining company’s employees develop one of more 
of these diseases, it follows that the mining company should be held responsible, 
because it has failed to fulfil its duties of care owed to its employees.308  
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5.2 The Common Law Duty of Care 
 The Constitutional Court’s development of the but-for test is not novel, and 
exceptions to the general rule have long been recognised, especially in English 
law.309 This was seen in Fairchild and McGhee above. Although exceptions to 
the but-for test have been criticised for causing uncertainty within the law of 
delict,310 Steel argues that certain exceptions should be defended.311 Steel 
justifies his defence by explaining that the law of delict places legal duties on 
people to act in ways that prevent harm to those around them.312 If a person 
breaches one of these legal duties, which Steel refers to as ‘primary duties’, then 
this triggers the rise of ‘secondary’ relations/duties between the two persons.313 A 
secondary duty or obligation refers to the remedy that a relevant court imposes in 
order for the wrongdoing to be corrected, such as the payment of 
compensation.314 In effect, a breach of the mining companies’ legal duties 
triggers a secondary obligation of payment of compensation owed to the 
mineworkers. 
 The Constitutional Court in Lee explained that the responsible authorities 
at Pollsmoor prison had a common law duty of care to ‘take reasonable 
measures to reduce the risk of contagion’ of tuberculosis among inmates.315 
Similarly, mining companies owe a common law duty of care to members of the 
silicosis and tuberculosis classes.316 The common law duties owed towards 
miners are the same regardless of the class the mineworker is in. Yet, the 
statutory duties will differ.  
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5.2.1 Breach of the Common Law Duty of Care  
 The common law duty of care owed to both the TB and silicosis classes is 
to ‘take reasonable measures to provide a safe and healthy working environment 
that was not injurious to their [employees’] health and/or to take reasonable care 
for the safety of persons entering the mines.’317 The Respondent mining 
companies breached this duty by exposing their employees to dust and gas 
levels that were higher than the statutorily mandated ‘safe levels’.318 The 
Respondent companies also failed to implement an effective ‘risk assessment 
programme’, which would have helped identify the risks posed by the inhalation 
of certain dusts and gases in the underground mines.319 The list identifies a 
myriad of common law duties that the Respondents failed to respect, and which 
the Applicants allege, were the causes of their silicosis.320 
5.3 The Statutory Duty of Care Owed to Both the Silicosis and the 
 TB Class 
 It was submitted in the Applicants’ affidavits that the Respondents had 
‘negligently, wrongfully and unlawfully breached the statutory duty of care’ that 
they owe to members of the silicosis and tuberculosis classes.321 The content of 
these duties can be found in the Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956 (“MWA”) and 
the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996. These statutory duties include the 
duty of mining companies to provide and to ensure: 
 1. ‘Safe and healthy environmental conditions for workmen...’;322 
2. That no mineworker is permitted to enter a mine where dust is 
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‘perceptible by sight’, unless the mineworker is ‘wearing effective 
apparatus to prevent inhalation of such ... dust’; and 323 
3. To ensure that the dust concentrations do not exceed the standard as 
set out by the Government Mining Engineer.324 
 The Applicants further submitted that the Respondent mining companies 
‘knew, or should have known that silicosis and other dust related occupational 
lung diseases’ could be prevented if the companies implemented proper 
engineering controls and other ‘good work practices’.325 Scientific literature 
adduced by the Applicants in Nkala also proves that the mining companies were 
as recently as 2008 still not in compliance with their legislative duties and 
requirements to control dust levels within the mines.326  
 The CC in Lee stated the prison authorities were so ‘pertinently aware of 
the risk’ of tuberculosis contagion amongst inmates.327 Similarly, the Respondent 
mining companies have been aware, for decades, of the risks of developing TB 
and silicosis in the mines, and of the number of mineworkers diagnosed with 
occupational diseases.328 It therefore seems that an awareness of risk should 
elevate the importance of legal duties of care. 
5.4 The Relationship between the Statutory and the Common Law 
 Duties of Care 
 The statutory duty of care and the common law duty of care owed by the 
mining companies both encompass the obligation to minimise the risk to which 
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the mineworkers are exposed.’329 Richard Spoor stated that contemporary 
occupational health and safety systems emphasise the importance of workplace 
risk management.330 A risk-management approach includes the following 
steps:331 
‘1. Identify hazards in the workplace; 
2. Assess the risks associated with those hazards; 
3. Determine measures to eliminate or mitigate the risk (the risk assessment 
process); 
4. Implement the measures; [and] 
5. Repeat.’ 
These principles can also be found in section 11 of the Mine Health and Safety 
Act 29 of 1996, which states that: 
‘Every employer must – (a) identify the hazards to health or safety to which 
employees may be exposed while they are at work; [and] (b) assess the risks to 
health or safety to which employees may be exposed while they are at work...’332  
 As stated by Spoor, the culpability of employers in this matter therefore 
‘pertains to the employer’s negligent breach of its duty of care, which is to take 
reasonable steps to mitigate the risk associated with hazards in the 
workplace.’333 In the case of the silicosis class, ‘the hazard is silica dust and the 
risk is the risk of contracting silicosis’.334 It is true that no mining company can 
completely eliminate this risk.335 Yet the fact that there will always be some 
measure of dust inhalation is what makes assessing the degree to which the 
Respondents attempted to mitigate such exposure of central importance for 
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assessing the culpability of mining companies with reference to the silicosis 
class.336 
Chapter 6 
6.1 The Distribution of Compensation 
 In Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport, the Applicants 
alleged that section 21 of the Road Accident Fund Act, 1996337 (“the RAF Act”), 
which bars a victim of a motor vehicle accident from claiming compensation 
under the common law, is irrational and unjustifiably limits certain constitutional 
rights, including the right to freedom and security of the person, as per section 12 
of the Constitution.338 The CC held that this limitation was ‘reasonable and 
justifiable’.339 The Court explained that the right to freedom and security of the 
person could be vindicated by way of a statutory compensation scheme.340  
 The Court also noted the advantages of a statutory compensation 
scheme, explaining that the primary aim of this scheme is to grant ‘reasonable, 
fair and affordable compensation to all innocent victims of motor accidents.’341 
There is no denying that statutory compensation schemes make it easier for 
victims, such as road accident victims and others, to claim compensation for 
injury, because they allow claimants to bypass potentially lengthy and costly 
litigation in order to assert their claims to compensation, if they meet certain 
requirements, of course.342 
 However, the establishment of statutory compensation schemes to protect 
constitutional rights should not override the fact that delictual remedies are also 
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necessary, in ‘appropriate circumstances’, to protect these rights.343 The 
mineworkers have instituted a claim in delict for compensation.344 The Applicant 
mineworkers, in setting out their common law claim for damages, noted that the 
Constitutional Court in Mankayi stated that ‘a delictual claim for damages at 
common law also constitutes an appropriate remedy for the violation of a 
constitutional right,’345 and it therefore seems correct that it is also an appropriate 
legal remedy to the class action.   
 The purpose of awarding damages is to ‘compensate an aggrieved 
party’.346 Compensation is therefore the relief that the Applicant mineworkers are 
owed. A fair and just award of compensation by way of a delict claim would 
vindicate the constitutional rights of the mineworkers because it would recognise 
that these rights have been breached and that the mining companies should 
have protected them from infringement. The Women’s Legal Centre has 
proposed that in the event that a court orders compensation in the class action, a 
portion of the damages award should be placed in a trust, so that it can be 
allocated to the women who have cared, and who continue to care, for the men 
who have developed silicosis.347 The Women’s Legal Centre explained that: 
 ‘What is important to us is that the case doesn’t just talk to the men’s losses from 
 the silicosis, but takes into account that these men are part of a larger family unit 
 and that in many cases it is women who are going to spend their time - but who 
 also give up other opportunities - to take care of the miners. This ‘price’ should 
 not be paid by the family and women, but should be a part of the award made 
 by the court when it looks at this.’348 
 Awarding compensation in the form of damages to mineworkers and those 
who have cared for them would allow for the vindication of the constitutional 
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rights of mineworkers and the recognition and acknowledgment of the people 
who have cared for these mineworkers. Therefore, if the relevant court in the 
class action suit in question finds that the Applicants are owed compensation 
through the law of delict, it should order that the mining companies distribute the 
compensation amount fairly among the mineworkers (and all those who have a 
valid claim for compensation, including the dependants of mineworkers). Such a 
distribution scheme could consist of a private fund in the form of a trust, for 
example. A compensation scheme of this nature is not novel. In 2016, Anglo 
American SA, together with AngloGold Ashanti, reached a settlement of over 
R500-million to be paid to 4,365 claimants who sued these companies for 
silicosis and silico-tuberculosis from a private fund.349  
 Nonetheless, it is hoped that this settlement could ‘pave the way for an 
industry wide compensation scheme for all gold-miners’ who suffer from silicosis 
and silico-tuberculosis and who meet certain requirements.350 Until such a 
statutory compensation scheme is established, claimants should be allowed to 
vindicate their section 8(2) constitutional rights by instituting a compensation 
claim in delict.   
Chapter 7 
7.1 Conclusion  
 This dissertation has explored the delictual element of factual causation 
with reference to the compensation claims instituted by TB and silicosis sufferers 
against gold mining companies, as set out in the Nkala judgment. The 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Lee v Correctional Services was analysed, 
where the Constitutional Court relaxed the inflexible test for factual causation in 
order to fairly assess the factual cause of the plaintiff’s infection, instead utilising 
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a material increase of risk analysis.351 It was argued that the Constitutional 
Court’s abandonment of the orthodox but-for test for factual causation in Lee, 
and subsequent application of the material increase of risk test, is precedent for 
the tuberculosis class, and should be applied to this class. 
 It was argued that the facts in Lee are analogous to those set out in Nkala. 
For example, there are significant parallels between the vulnerability of prisoners 
and miners, there is comparability between the negligent omissions of the State 
and the mining companies352 and in both cases, the State and the mining 
companies owed similar constitutional obligations to the incarcerated persons, 
such as Lee, and to mineworkers, respectively.353 It is on the basis of this 
substantial congruence between the two matters that the abandonment of the 
but-for test is warranted, and that the factual causation test, as reinterpreted in 
Lee, should apply to the TB class within the class action suit. It was also 
submitted that the material contribution test would be a fair factual causation 
standard by which to assess factual causation in the silicosis class, as the 
evidential burden on this class is more easily satisfied than that of the TB 
class.354  
 Furthermore, the legal duties of care that mining companies owe to their 
employees were analysed.355  Establishing these duties is a requirement of both 
the material increase of risk test and the material contribution test, and will 
therefore be analysed by the trial court when coming to a conclusion on factual 
causation in this matter.356  
 Finally, if the class action is given the green light, then it is up to the trial 
court to decide whether or not the mineworkers are entitled to compensation in 
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terms of the law of delict, which would necessarily invoke an application of a test 
for factual causation. The trial court should apply alternative tests to the but-for 
test, in the form of the material increase in risk test, and the material contribution 
test, when determining factual causation in the class action.357 Such an 
assessment of factual causation would be fair and reasonable in the 
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9.  Annexures 
 
9.1 Annexure ‘A’: Interview with Dr Rodney Ehrlich 
 
 
Emeritus Professor Rodney Ehrlich 
Senior Research Scholar 
School of Public Health and Family Medicine 
University of Cape Town. 
14.11.2016 
 
(1) In your experience, are mining companies in South Africa employing the 
necessary measures to prevent and treat silicosis, silico-tuberculosis and 
pulmonary tuberculosis in mines? If not, which measures should they be 
employing/how should mining companies be improving on existing engineering 
and medical measures? 
 
There are a number of separate but overlapping questions here. 
 
i.  There is no medical treatment of silicosis, which is the replacement of healthy 
lung tissue by fibrosis (scar tissue). Prevention of silicosis requires reduction of 
the amount of silica dust inhaled by miners.  I have not seen evidence that dust 
respirators are a long term solution underground, which puts the burden on 
reducing the amount of dust in the air.  This requires an engineering (and cost) 
expertise which I do not have, but the elements are ventilation, wetting and 
filtration. All of these are expensive in money, energy and water.  Another 
solution is mechanisation, which involves the replacement of workers by 
equipment.  There has already been major shrinkage of the gold mining industry 
with attendant social repercussions (although not because of mechanisation). 
 
It seems that there was little pressure on the gold mining industry to control dust 
between the 1940s and the 1990s. There general view was that airborne dust 
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concentrations had not fallen for 50 years, as stated in the 1996 Commission of 
Enquiry (Leon Commission), although the actual evidence in the public domain of 
dust counts over this long period is scarce.  
 
Recent pressures to reduce dust concentrations underground (and in dusty 
surface operations) have come from the Mine Health and Safety Act (1996) 
which requires a number of actions in respect of disease surveillance and 
prevention; studies showing a very high prevalence of silicosis (dating from late 
1990s); the technical insolvency of the Compensation Fund under the 
Occupational Diseases and Mines and Works Act and the substantial hike in 
levies (insurance premiums) on mining companies; the  ILO/WHO programme to 
eliminate silicosis (dating from 2003); lawsuits (dating from 2008) and the public 
sentiment in favour of justice linked to these lawsuits. 
 
In the last few years the Department of Minerals and Energy has started to make 
public dust information obtained from the mining companies themselves. These 
seem to indicate a declining percentage of dust concentrations above the 
statutory silica dust occupational exposure limit (but see below).  This suggests 
improved control, but these data need to be independently verified, which is a 
problem given the limited resources at the disposal of the state. 
 
ii.   Tuberculosis became treatable with short course therapy in the 1970s. (In the 
1950s - 1960s treatment was drawn out over 18 months to 2 years and often not 
completed; before that, there was no drug treatment).   
 
For much of its history the mining industry in South Africa was dominated by a 
few large mining houses, whose interests were represented by the Chamber of 
Mines. Through accumulated capital and political influence they were able to 
shape a migrant labour system operating through much of Southern Africa.   
Medical examinations to determine fitness to work on the mines was part of the 
system they built, and with the high rate of physical injury on the mines and 
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original remoteness of the mines from state medical services, there was 
significant investment in medical services as evidenced by hospitals such as the 
Ernest Oppenheimer in Welkom.    
 
Thus the mines with well developed medical services are certainly able to screen 
for and treat tuberculosis among their employees.  Some have developed HIV 
treatment  programmes.  However, significant change in ownership in the mining 
sector, the unbundling of big mining houses and pressure on profits from 
depressed commodity prices is likely to have put pressure on the sustainability of 
these medical services.  Also, smaller mining companies and newer companies 
taking over mines would not have this capacity – I have not seen any information 
on what they do. I would predict that tuberculosis and HIV treatment of employed 
miners will be increasingly shifted onto overburdened state services.  
 
However, the big problem regarding TB and HIV is treatment of ex-miners who 
do not have access to mining services, but are dependent on poorly resourced 
state health services in rural South African areas and in neighbouring countries. 
 
Prevention of tuberculosis would require reduction of silica dust, control of HIV 
infection, prevention of reactivation of old tuberculous infection, and prevention of 
reinfection (i.e. with a new strain of tuberculosis). Treatment of tuberculosis and 
HIV infection and silica dust control have been mentioned. A recent mass trial on 
a number of mines of tuberculosis prophylaxis with a one drug regimen, isoniazid 
(the  “Thibela TB” trial) disappointingly showed no community benefit.  
 
Beyond these medical measures, prevention of tuberculosis would require broad 
based public health measures to be effectively implemented by employers, 
including education for behaviour change (to reduce HIV risk), improved living 
circumstances (particularly reduction of crowding) for TB risk, and mitigation of 
effects of migrancy on the risk of these diseases.  Some of the larger companies 
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do have programmes or intentions in this regard, but how successful they have 
been I cannot say. 
 
(2) Do you think that the South African mining sector can draw on examples from 
other countries in terms of promoting adequate prevention and treatment of these 
diseases? For example, are there success stories that South African should 
drawn on? 
 
An important example was the Vermont (USA) granite industry which worked out 
the maximum dust concentration to prevent significant silicosis as far back as the 
1940s. By the 1960s they had effectively eliminated silicosis from the industry.  
On the basis of that experience, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health in the US recommended an occupational exposure limit for silica of 0.05 
milligrams per cubic metre (mg/m3) of air in 1974.  The South African government 
and mining industry did not follow suit and the informal (non-legislated) silica 
exposure limit was kept at approximately double this level until the present. 
(When a statutory limit was eventually promulgated in the 1990s it was left at 0.1 
mg/m3).  The industry has recently undertaken to aim for the NIOSH 1974 limit 
(i.e. half the current statutory limit) by 2024, but this is not yet a statutory 
requirement.   
 
Developed countries such as Canada and Australia were also successful at 
eliminating silicosis to a large extent. In both cases, and certainly in Australia, 
mechanisation has played an important role.  In defending its record, the South 
African industry has argued that it is unique in the depth of gold mining and the 
labour intensiveness of its operations. Depth (now approaching 5 km) certainly 
has implications for the movement of air and the use of water.  You will need to 
ask an independent mining engineer about the exact nature of the constraints 
and the costs involved.    
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(3) I understand that mineworkers who develop silicosis are more susceptible to 
developing tuberculosis (silica-tuberculosis). However, have studies concluded 
as to whether or not mineworkers who are exposed to silica dust, but who do not 
develop silicosis, also have an increased risk of developing tuberculosis in the 
mines? 
 
The problem with formulating the question in this way is that studies of silicosis 
and tuberculosis are reliant on radiological silicosis, that is fibrosis that is evident 
a chest x-ray, or on a CT scan (as the latter start to be done more commonly in 
developed countries).  However, silicosis has a long period in which the fibrosis 
in the lung is not visible radiologically – we call this subradiological silicosis.   The 
only country which could do studies of subradiological silicosis is South Africa 
since we have 40 years of digital autopsy data from statutory autopsies done at 
the National Institute of Occupational Health in Johannesburg.  A 1998 study 
showed that the risk of tuberculosis is evident even with very little silicosis in the 
lung – a level which would be invisible on the chest x-ray.  So the first answer is 
that it takes very little silicosis in the lung tissue to increase the risk of 
tuberculosis.   
 
The next question is whether a lung in which there is no evidence of tissue 
fibrosis, i.e. where there dust but no fibrosis, is at increased risk of tuberculosis. 
The one study which attempted to answer this specific question (Murray and 
Hnizdo, 1998) was not quite able to answer the question because of the method 
of analysis they used.   
  
However, if one turns to laboratory evidence, i.e. evidence from cell cultures, etc. 
(“in vitro”) and from animal (mice usually) experiments (“in vivo”), there is a lot of 
evidence that silica particles impair the ability of the lung’s defence system, 
specifically the macrophage defence cells, to deal with Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis.  Silica does by either killing the macrophages or reducing their 
effectiveness.   So allowing for the two different evidentiary contexts (human field 
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studies and laboratory studies), it is likely that in silica exposed miners, without 
any fibrosis in their lungs but just silica containing dust have an increased risk of 
tuberculosis. 
 
(4) Please could you explain the relationship between the development of HIV, 
silicosis and silico-tuberculosis amongst mineworkers in South Africa? 
 
At the biological level, HIV infection impairs the ability of the immune system to 
deal with a whole range of common and rare infections.  Pre-eminent among the 
common infections, certainly in Southern Africa, is tuberculosis. An HIV infected 
miner has a greatly increased risk of developing active tuberculosis compared to 
a miner who is not HIV infected. HIV and silicosis are thus two powerful risk 
factors for the development of active tuberculosis.  The one study that studied 
their combined effect found that the risk of a HIV infected miner with silicosis was 
up to 16 times that of a miner with neither silicosis nor HIV infection. (There has 
not been a replication of this study, but it is the one always quoted).   HIV 
infection also greatly increases the risk of recurrent tuberculosis (i.e. suffering a 
second or later episode of tuberculosis).  Given the high prevalence of HIV 
infection among miners, and specifically gold and platinum miners of between 11 
and 25% (depending province and date), it is appropriate to talk of triple 
epidemic. 
 
At the social level, it is likely that migrancy, the dominant form of labour on the 
gold and platinum mines, increases the risk of HIV infection, presumably through 
the multiple sexual networks to which miners belong. There is one study from 
Lesotho showing that the wives of migrant miners have a greater risk of being 
HIV positive than the wives of migrant non-miners. 
 




9.2 Annexure ‘B’: Interview with Richard Spoor 
 
 
(1) Do you think that the Constitutional Court’s test for factual causation, as 
employed in Lee v Minister of Correctional Services, is precedent for future 
silicosis and tuberculosis litigation in South Africa?  
 
Yes it is  
 
(2) Do you envision the outcome of the silicosis class action ruling to have a 
significant effect on how mining companies in SA in future treat their employees, 
and on the measures they employ to protect their employees from silicosis and 
TB? 
 
Yes I do. The issues will however be tested in individual cases that precede the 
class litigation.  
 
Silicosis is stronger than the TB cases because the disease is caused by the 
cumulative impact of a serious of insults over an extended period of time. 
Silicosis is not caused by any single event. No single insult causes the disease 
they only contribute to it. 
 
The disease itself covers a spectrum of degrees of injury from radiological signs 
or signs only visible on biopsy under microscopy (ie disease without any clinical 
impairment) to very severe injury causing death.  
 
The claim against the mine owner is therefore not dependent on proving 
negligent conduct that caused the disease, it only requires us to prove negligent 
conduct that has contributed to making the disease as severe as it is. 
 
Proving that the negligent act or omission increased dust levels and therefore 
contributed to the severity of the disease is easier than proving causation.  
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(3) Do you think that English case law, such as that expressed in Fairchild, 
Sienkiewicz, Bonnington Castings and McGhee, provide useful alternatives to the 
traditional factual causation ‘but-for’ test? In other words, which factual causation 
test do you think South African courts should be employing in silicosis and 
tuberculosis cases? Do you think the standard of proof should be lowered in such 
matters?  
 
Fairchild is consistent with modern occupational health and safety systems, 
which emphasize risk management. This approach entails: 
 1. identify hazards in the workplace,  
2. assess the risks associated with those hazards  
3. determine measures to eliminate or mitigate the risk (the risk assessment 
process) 4. Implement the measures.  
5. repeat 
 
These fundamental principles are embodied in section 11 of the Mine Health and 
Safety Act of 1996 
 
The underlying premise is that accidents and diseases are not caused by one off 
events caused by exposure to risk. It is seldom possible to eliminate exposure to 
hazards such as dust, so what must be done is to mitigate the risk associated 
with exposure to that hazard.  
 
Culpability pertains to the employers negligent breach of its duty of care which is 
to take reasonable steps to mitigate the risk associated with the hazards in the 
workplace.  
 
Unless the hazard can be removed entirely the best an employer can do is to 
mitigate the risk, he cannot eliminate it entirely and therefore accidents and 
diseases are statistically speaking inevitable. 
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The employers breach of his duty of care can therefore is never the cause of the 
accident. The employers breach of the fundamental duty of care owed to 
employees can only increase the risk and therefore the likelihood of an accident 
occurring. That likelihood can only be measured statistically. 
 
So if we look at silicosis, the hazard is silica dust and the risk is the risk of 
contracting silicosis. The hazard cannot be eliminated, there is always dust, but 
the risk of contracting silicosis can be minimised by reducing employees 
exposure to dust. 
 
Regardless of the efficacy of the measures taken, statistically some employees 
who are exposed to dust will go on to develop silicosis.  
 
The cause is exposure to silica dust. So if the question is “But for the employers 
breach of his duty of care would the employees have contracted silicosis?” The 
answer can only be that he would have been less likely to do so. How much less 
likely? That is question of statistical probability, it could be anywhere in the range 
of 0 – 100%. It cannot be the case that the employers breach has to have 
increased the risk of disease by more than 50% before it can be held liable. This 
is whay Fairchild refers only to a materially increased risk.  
 
What is material will be within the discretion of the court and will depend on the 
evidence. Materiality will be closely linked to the degree of negligence on the 
employers part.   
 
So for example the failure to stipulate the use of personal protective equipment 
and to provide same, such as gloves, overalls, safety boots, hearing protection or 
goggles may, only increase the risk of a specific injury or disease by a trivial 
degree, but it is such a basic, cheap and easy to implement measure that the 
75	  
court will hold the employer liable, even though the contribution to the risk was 
minor. 
 
In Fairchild the employer was held liable on the grounds that it materially 
contributed to the increased risk of the employee becoming ill. 
 
Fairchild is therefore consistent with modern notions about the cause of 
occupational injuries and diseases and their prevention. 
 
High exposure doesn’t mean that the employee will develop silicosis and low 
exposure will not necessarily prevent it. There are only degrees of risk of 
contracting the disease. If the employer fails to take reasonable steps to mitigate 
the risk or its conduct materially increased the risk associated with the hazard, 
then it is liable on that basis.  
 
The statutory duty of care, and I submit the common law duty of care is to 
minimise the risk to which people are exposed.  
 
(4) In a similar vein, do you think a delictual claim is the most appropriate 
mechanism through which to provide compensation to mineworkers and their 
dependants? Or do you think a statutory compensation scheme should be set up 
to provide compensation? 
 
Consistent with the risk management approach is the notion that risk is integral to 
work and cannot be eliminated entirely. Occupational injuries and diseases are 
an invariable consequence of the work process and the costs associated with 
them are therefore a cost of doing business. The employer controls the degree of 
risk and therefore the number and severity of the accidents and diseases. The 
employer should be strictly liable for the harm that arises and fault should not 
play a role.  
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There must therefore be a statutory scheme to fully compensate injured workers. 
There is no good argument to discount their compensation on the basis that 
there is a no fault system. Such a discount is a product of outdated notions of 
fault. 
 
(5) In the High Court Nkaya judgment, the Court sets out the two classes in 
which the class action is separated. The first being ‘mineworkers who have 
contracted silicosis [...] whether or not accompanied by any other disease’. Does 
this include pulmonary tuberculosis? I.e. does this class include all mineworkers 
who have contracted TB and developed silicosis, whereas the second class is 
limited to mineworkers who have TB only? 
 
Yes the Silicosis class cover silicosis and all its complications including silico-
tuberculosis which is TB in the presence of silicosis. 
 
The TB class does not include anyone with silicosis. 
 
     *** 
